

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5736

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 6413

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E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: MASS,JO, US

SUBJECT: HAWK MISSILES: DELIVERY SCHEDULE ISSUE

RER: AMMAN 6395

1. SUMMARY: IF JORDANIAN HAWK SALE SURVIVES CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION, GIVEN KING HUSSEIN'S DESIRE TO MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO LETTER OF OFFER, WE FACE THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO ABOUT DELIVERY SCHEDULES FOR HAWK. WE BELIEVE THAT FOR LETTER OF OFFER TO GO AHEAD TO START PRODUCTION PROCESS, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CHANGE DELIVERY DATES AS CURRENTLY CONTEMPLATED IN PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CONGRESS, BUT WITHIN THAT FRAME WORK WE MUST HAVE A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL TO OFFER TO HUSSEIN. SINCE HUSSEIN'S BASIS FOR PROCEEDING IS THAT TRAINED CREWS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE ROUGHLY CONCURRENTLY WITH HAWK BATTERY DELIVERIES, WE WILL NEED TO LOOK IN DETAIL WITH THE JORDANIANS AT THE TREMENDOUSLY COMPLICATED QUESTION OF AN OVERALL TRAINING PLAN. WE THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT WE BE PREPARED TO PRESENT KING HUSSEIN CONCURRENTLY WITH HIS LETTER OF OFFER, A CLASSIFIED SIDE LETTER WHICH (A) INDICATES IN MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE TERMS OUR CAPACITY TO BE FORTHCOMING (B) INTER ALIA RELATES TRAINING SCHEDULES TO DELIVERIES AND PROPOSES JOINT US JORDANIAN PREPARATION OF AN OVERALL HAWK TRAINING PLANS AS ONE BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION (C) PRESERVES OUR COMMITMENT TO CONGRESS AND TO OUR OWN

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PRODUCTION CAPACITIES IN TERMS WHICH ARE LEAST NEURALGIC

FOR KING TO ACCEPT, END SUMMARY.

2. IF JORDANIAN AIR DEFENSE ISSUE GETS THROUGH CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL WAITING PERIOD, NEXT IMMEDIATE ISSUE WILL BE DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR HAWK MISSILES. PROBLEM REVOLVES AROUND FACT THAT GOJ HAS PUBLICLY INDICATED (REFTEL) THAT "DELIVERY DATES FOR HAWK MISSILES AS WRITTEN IN PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER DO NOT MEET NEEDS OF JORDAN, WHICH STRONGLY DESIRES THEIR DELIVERY ONCE OUR ARMED FORCES COMPLETE THEIR TRAINING ON THEM AND ONCE THEY PROVE THAT THEY CAN HANDLE THESE WEAPONS WITHOUT GIVING ATTENTION TO ANY OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. THIS POSITION WAS TAKEN BY KING JUSSEIN PERSONAL URGING AND KING PERSONALLY REGARDS DELIVERY DATES AS A KEY ISSUE FOR BOTH INTERNAL MORALE AND INTER ARAB REASONS.

3. IN ASSESSING ISSUE, WE SEE FOLLOWING PERTINENT FACTORS.

THE CONGRESS-- WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO CONGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE DELIVERY DATES INCLUDED IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. WE ASSUME THIS OBLIGATION CAN BE ONLY MODIFIED AFTER CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS AND THAT PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE IN ALTERED DELIVERY DATES WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE AT SOME LATER DATE.

4. JORDAN-- WE HAVE KING'S REQUIREMENT FOR SOME SPEED-UP IN DELIVERIES. THE KING DOES NOT WISH TO APPEAR IN EYES OF OTHER ARABS AND OF HIS OWN ARMY AND PEOPLE TO BE ACQUIESCING TO PROLONGED DELAY IN DELIVERY AND THEREFORE WILL PUT UP DETERMINED CAMPAIGN TO OBTAIN SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA. (DEPARTMENT IS AWARE THAT KING HAS HABIT OF PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN SUCH MILITARY SUPPLY DETAILS, WHICH HE TAKES EXTREMELY SERIOUSLY.)

5. SECOND FACTOR IS TRAINING AND LOGISTICS OF PRODUCTION AND DELIVERY OF MISSILES. PRESIDENT LETTER
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SPECIFIES THAT "INITIAL DELIVERY WILL CONSIST OF ONE BATTERY EACH IN OCTOBER, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER OF 1976. DELIVERIES OF THE NEXT THREE WILL BE MADE DURING THE PERIOD OF JANUARY-MARCH 1978. DELIVERIES OF THE REMAINING EIGHT BATTERIES WILL BEGIN APPROXIMATELY 30 MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE JORDANIAN SIGNATURE OF THE LETTER OF OFFER AND WILL BE MADE OVER A PERIOD EXTENDING INTO 1979" WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE HAVE A PROBLEM WITH GOJ

CONCERNING DELIVERY DATES ON INITIAL THREE BATTERIES.
ALL JAF TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR MANNING THOSE BATTERIES
WILL NOT BE COMPLETED UNTIL OCTOBER 1976(ASSUMING ENTRY
INTO NOVEMBER 1975-11-MONTH COURSE) KING WOULD
PROBABLY LIKE TO SPEED UP TRAINING SO AS TO RECEIVE
REMAINING ELEVEN BATTERIES AT SHORT AND REGULAR
INTERVALS AFTER RECEIVING INITIAL THREE BATTERIES.PRIME
MINISTER RIFAI HAS TOLD US INFORMALLY HIS OWN IDEAL DELIVERY
SCHEDULE IS ONE BATTERY PER MONTH. BEGINNING IN OCTOBER
1976(AND THEREFORE ENDING IN JANUARY 1978, ALTHOUGH HE
HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF TRAINING REQUIREMENTS) OR
ARMY ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY).

6. ON THE OTHER HAND CHIEF OF STAFF BIN SHAKER HAS
INDICATED INFORMALLY THAT HE HAS TAKEN AND WILL TAKE THE
POSITION THAT HE DOES NOT WANT TO HAVE ANY BETTERY
DELIVERED UNTIL JAF CREWS ARE TRAINED AND CAPABLE OF
PUTTING IT INTO OPERATION.

7. IN FACT THERE MAY BE A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN
USG AND JORDANIAN POSITIONS(A) ASSUMING JORDANIANS
CONTINUE TO APPLY TRAINING READINESS CRITERION AND (B)
ASSUMING THAT WE CAN PRESENT CONVINCING CASE ON TRAINING
CONSTRAINTS TO KING AND JAF BASED ON MAXIMUM USG EFFORT
TO PROVIDE TRAINING AND TO GRANT HEAVY PRIORITY TO
JORDANIAN TRAINING NEEDS.WHILE KING WILL UNDOUBTEDLY
BE WILLING TO GRANT THE HIGHEST JORDANIAN PRIORITY TO
HAWK TRAINING JAF MAY WELL HAVE PROBLEMS PRODUCING
ENOUGH QUALIFIED TRAINING CANDIDATES, AT LEAST IN
LATER STAGES.

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8. WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR US TO SHOW WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF JORDANIANS IN TRAINING PROGRAMS BEGINNING THIS FALL. GESTURE WILL REASSURE KING WE ARE NOT USING TRAINING SPACE LIMITATIONS AS AN EXCUSE FOR FOOTDRAGGING. WE ASSUME THAT, WITH TIME, TRAINING CONSTRAINTS WILL MODERATE SIGNIFICANTLY JAF CAPACITY TO ABSORB LATER BATTERIES.

9. MAJOR CURRENT PROBLEM IS DELIVERY OF SECOND THREE BATTERIES. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD INDICATE TO KING WE WILL MAKE MAJOR EFFORT TO REVIEW POSSIBILITY OF SPEEDING UP THAT DELIVERY WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF OUR OWN SIGNIFICANT CONSTRAINTS. AS TO PRODUCTION SCHEDULES, WE NOTE THAT PRESIDENT'S LETTER HAS ALREADY ADVANCED DELIVERY OF THESE HAWKS BY THREE MONTHS (JANUARY-MARCH 1978) OVER THAT PROPOSED IN WASHINGTON JOINT COMMISSION OF APRIL (30 MONTHS FROM ASSUMED OCTOBER 1, 1975 ACCEPTANCE OF LOA, OR APRIL 1978).

10. SECONDLY, WE ASSUME SOME HAWK BATTERIES IN PRODUCTION ARE FOR IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA. WE NOTE THAT SHAH HAS GIVEN KING HUSSEIN CONSIDERABLE MORAL BACKING IN TERMS OF "ONEROUS CONDITIONS" ON HAWK SALE WE MIGHT THEREFORE INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITY OF SEEING A SWITCH OF SOME IRAN HAWKS TO JORDAN ON THE BASIS MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND JORDAN TO DO SO. SIMILAR POSSIBILITY MIGHT EXIST WITH REGARD TO SAUDI ARABIA IN ORDER TO PROVIDE
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BASIS FOR REVIEWING THIS MATTER INTERNALLY, EMBASSY BELIEVES IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR DEPARTMENT AND DOD OBTAIN INFO ON CURRENT HAWK PRODUCTION SCHEDULE INCLUDING DATES OF IRANIAN/SAUDI HAWK PRODUCTION AS BACKGROUND FOR WHAT WE ARE DOING HERE.

11. EMBASSY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FACTS AND ASSESSMENT, HAS REACHED THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:
A. IN ORDER TO BEGIN WORK ON THE PRODUCTION OF HAWK MISSILES FOR JORDAN, IDEALLY JORDAN SHOULD PROCEED TO SIGN LETTER OF OFFER IMMEDIATELY;
B. IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE KING'S DESIRE FOR FLEXIBILITY ON DELIVERY DATES, HE WILL REQUIRE SOME WRITTEN ARRANGEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH LETTER OF OFFER PROVIDING HIM WITH SOME ASSURANCE THAT WE WILL LOOK AT THIS PROBLEM AS A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY AND INTEREST;
C. THE KING'S BASIS FOR PROCEEDING IS TO LINK TRAINING WITH HAWK DELIVERIES. THE UNKNOWN INVOLVED

IN TRAINING PLANS AT THIS POINT ARE ENORMOUS AND A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF JOINT WORK WILL BE REQUIRED BEFORE WE HAVE CLEAR IDEA OF HOW TRAINING OF JORDANIANS ACTUALLY RELATES TO PRESENT DELIVERY SCHEDULES.

12. THEREFORE WE PROPOSE FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION PROCEEDING AS FOLLOWS:

A. PRESENTING CURRENT LETTER OF OFFER AND URGING EARLIEST POSSIBLE SIGNATURE. LETTER OF OFFER WOULD BE PRESENTED WITH CLASSIFIED SIDE LETTER WHICH WOULD INDICATE TO THE KING, QUITE POSSIBLY IN TERMS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN INCLUDED IN MESSAGES FROM THE SECRETARY BUT AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE, OUR DETERMINATION TO REVIEW WITH THE JORDANIANS AND TO DO WHATEVER WE ARE CAPABLE OF DOING ON FUTURE DELIVERY DATES.

B. PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AS ONE BASIS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE DELIVERY DATE QUESTION, THE JOINT PREPARATION BY US AND JORDANIAN EXPERTS OF AN OVERALL TRAINING PLAN CONNECTED WITH HAWK. THE PLAN WOULD INVOLVE MAXIMUM USE OF TRAINING SPACES IN THE US AND JORDAN TO PREPARE JORDANIAN OPERATIONAL AND INSTRUCTOR PERSONNEL.

C. THE PLAN WOULD FORESEE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL TRAINING FACILITIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHICH

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COULD ALSO BE USED TO SUPPLEMENT US EFFORT. THE TRAINING PLAN WOULD BE BASIS FOR FUTURE TALKS WITH JORDAN OF THEIR DELIVERY SCHEDULE PROBLEM. UNTIL WE KNOW WHAT TRAINING CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE ON WHAT BASIS, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO TALK ABOUT DELIVERY SCHEDULES IN THE TERMS WHICH THE KING HAS PROPOSED.

D. LETTER WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE PHRASED TO INDICATE THAT WE WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NECESSARY CONGRESSIONAL AND US LOGISTICS IMPLICATIONS. THIS WOULD BE A STATEMENT TO COVER THE RECORD FOR CONGRESS AND TO PUT THE JORDANIANS ON NOTICE THAT MANUFACTURING DATES, ETC. ARE ALSO CRITICAL ISSUES AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED.

12. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, INCLUDING THE CURRENT DELIVERY DATES IN THE LETTER OFFER WILL BE A TICKLISH SITUATION. KING MAY WISH TO FINESSE THIS BY ONLY A GENERAL STATEMENT IN THE LETTER OFFER. THAT GENERAL STATEMENT MIGHT RELATE TO SIDE LETTER PROPOSED ABOVE IN WHICH CURRENT DELIVERY SCHEDULE COULD BE ALSO INCORPORATED, OR SCHEDULE MAY BE INCLUDED IN AN ADDITIONAL SIDE LETTER. THESE TWO OPTIONS WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE EXAMINED CAREFULLY AND WOULD BE PART OF OUR GENERAL NEGOTIATING APPROACH.

14. WHATEVER SIDE LETTERS ARE PREPARED, THEY WOULD HAVE

TO BE SUCH AS COULD BE SHOWN TO THE CONGRESS TO CONTINUE
TO REASSURE THEM THAT WE ARE CURRENTLY PROCEEDING ON THE ORIGINAL
BASIS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.

14. OBVIOUSLY THERE MAY BE OTHER APPROACHES TO THE
PROBLEM. WE ARE SUGGESTING THE ABOVE ONLY BECAUSE IN
THE SHORT TIME AVAILABLE WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE FULLY TO
DEVELOP SUITABLE ALTERNATIVES. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS
IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT PRESENT DELIVERY DATES WITH VERY
MINOR CHANGES MAY COME CLOSE TO, IF NOT EXACTLY COINCIDE
WITH, TRAINING SCHEDULES.

16. REGARDING TIMING, WE BELIEVE QUICK RESPONSE WILL BE
REQUIRED FROM USG IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CONGRESSIONAL
APPROVAL OF HAWKS. WE THEREFORE REQUEST EXPEDITIOUS
RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL, TO ACCOMPANY PRESENTATION
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OF LOA NEXT WEEK WHICH WE REQUESTED (43*TEL) BE FORWARDED
TO US BY SPECIAL DOD COURIER. WE ALSO REQUEST THAT DOD
BEGIN PRELIMINARY WORK ON LOOKING AT JORDANIAN TRAINING
PLAN AND ON SELECTION OF SMALL, HIGHLY QUALIFIED
TRAINING TEAM TO COME TO JORDAN IN VERY NEAR FUTURE.
(IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE SUCH A TEAM WILL BE NEEDED SHOULD
JORDANIANS WISH TO HAVE A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF TRAINING
AVAILABILITIES PRIOR TO SIGNING LOA.)
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Message Attributes

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Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
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Concepts: MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL TRAINING, CAT-C, MILITARY SALES, MISSILES, CONTRACTS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 SEP 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
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TAGS: MASS, JO, US
To: STATE
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